Frederic S. (Tony) Mabbatt: The surge in Iraq succeeded tactically but has otherwise failed

Did the surge in Iraq succeed or not? That is one of the key questions being asked of the two presidential candidates during this election campaign. Sen. John McCain says yes. Sen. Barack Obama's response is more nuanced. I suggest that the question can only be answered adequately if it is considered on two levels - tactical and strategic.

By the tactical level, I mean how the battle is being fought. It involves the choice of tactics and resources being used on the battlefield.

Strategy refers to why the battle is being fought in the first place. Strategy describes the mission the battle is seeking to accomplish.

On the tactical level, it seems clear that the surge succeeded. Violence to Iraqi civilians and the level of American casualties were both reduced dramatically. As a result, it has been possible to turn over to Iraqi forces the security responsibility for significant areas of the country. The additional 30,000 American troops, the counter-insurgency tactics brilliantly employed by Gen. David Petreus, the assistance provided by Sunni groups fed up with the violence perpetrated by al-Qaida elements, and the stand-down by the Mahdi Army, are all credited for these favorable results.

The result of the surge on the strategic level is far less clear. The strategic goal or mission that the surge was designed to accomplish was to provide a period of relative quiet in which the Iraqi government would be able to get its political act together. While the government has made some progress, many of the most critical issues remain unresolved.

Furthermore, to be properly evaluated, the surge must be viewed in the context of the Iraq War as a whole and, in particular, in terms of the cost of the war compared with the benefits realized. It is the second longest war in U.S. history, and the second most costly - surpassed only by World War II. These costs are running at an estimated $12 billion a month, with a total cost including care for veterans and replenishment of depleted military equipment estimated to eventually exceed $1.5 trillion. Then there are the 4,155 U.S. military deaths and 30,568 wounded, the estimated 90,000 Iraqi deaths and 5 million Iraqis displaced from their homes.

As to our overall strategic position in the Middle East, the war has been a recruiting poster for the terrorists, made Iran the superpower in the region, diverted our attention from Afghanistan where the Taliban are now resurgent, weakened our alliances and eroded our prestige and influence in the world.

And what benefits did we gain to compare with these horrendous costs? We invaded to eliminate weapons of mass destruction - but there were none. We invaded to avenge 9/11 - but Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11. We invaded to prevent Iraq from assisting al-Qaida - but there were no al-Qaida terrorists in Iraq before we invaded. We invaded to eliminate Saddam Hussein - but we already had him boxed in with weapons inspectors on the ground and our air force flying over two-thirds of the country on a daily basis. We invaded to establish a pro-American western-style democracy in the Middle East - but Iraq's religious, ethnic and tribal divisions and traditions proved to be barren ground.

We waged war on the basis of false premises, for dubious goals, with failed strategies, and at unacceptable cost. The surge may have succeeded on a tactical level, but on every other level, the war, by any rational measure, was not worth the cost.

Frederic S. (Tony) Mabbatt of Sun Valley is a retired senior foreign service officer.